a. In general. The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
b. Consent to bodily harm. When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such harm is a defense if:
(1) The bodily harm consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious; or
(2) The conduct and the harm are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a concerted activity of a kind not forbidden by law; or
(3) The consent establishes a justification for the conduct under chapter 3 of the code.
c. Ineffective consent. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if:
(1) It is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct charged to constitute the offense; or
(2) It is given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease or defect or intoxication is manifestly unable or known by the actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature of harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute an offense; or
(3) It is induced by force, duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-10, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.